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Summary
According to the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between farm size and
land productivity, farm size can be an important determinant of success for
the land reform farms in South Africa. The analysis in this thesis provides
empirical evidence in the debate on whether the land reform should equalize
the land distributions or keep the large-scale sector intact. A strong inverse
relationship is found between farm size and land productivity indicating that
small-scale beneciaries in the land reform are more ecient than large-scale
beneciaries. Through indirect testing the result is attributed to intensive
labour use and more extensive land use on small farms. The comparative
advantage of the small-scale beneciaries provides a strong argument to re-
distribute smaller holdings. This would increase output of land reform farms
and probably absorb more labour, which will be a crucial contribution to
alleviation of rural poverty and the success of land reform farms.
This thesis will rst present the theory and discuss previous literature of the
inverse relationship. Then I will use data on farms controlled by beneciaries
from a cross sectional data set from the Quality of Life survey (QoL) of 2005.
Using Stata 10.0, the analysis starts with regressing farm size on land yield,
dened as the value of output per land unit, which is the classical approach to
test if there exists an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity.
The theory of the inverse relationship postulates that the use of cheaper fam-
ily labour on small farms, is the source of the often observed relationship.
The empirical analysis shows that there is indeed a negative relationship be-
tween farm size and land productivity among the beneciaries of the land
reform. This indicates that small farms are more ecient and that labour
market imperfections are dominant. Critics of the above analysis assert that
the observation of an inverse relationship is caused by unobserved land qual-
ity dierences (Benjamin, 1995). However, when controlling for land quality
and other variables that may bias the results the inverse relationship remains
intact. To test if labour market imperfections are the reason for the results
the analysis is redone only for large farms. If the results are caused by fam-
ily labour use on smaller farms the IR should become less signicant since
the entire range of large farms are to a larger degree dependent on hired
labour (Bhalla, 1979). The results show that the relationship between farm
size and land productivity is less signicant for large farms, indicating that
the intensive labour use on small farms is an important determinant of the
observed inverse relationship. According to this analysis subdivision of land
reform projects will increase output, more of the available land will be used
and the projects will create more jobs in the agricultural sector. A relevant
policy implication is that smaller land holdings should be made available on
the market, and that subdivision of farms can indeed be a criteria for success
in the South African land reform.
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1 Introduction
Since the fall of Apartheid land reform has been a major development policy
in South Africa. Pre-apartheid policies led to a highly unequal land distri-
bution based on race making the black rural population a poor lower class;
71 percent of poor households in South Africa are black rural people (Zim-
merman, 2000). In this situation there is indeed a need for rural poverty
reduction and redistribution of property rights. The main goals of the land
reform are, apart from addressing historical injustices, rural poverty allevia-
tion, economic growth, and redistribution of income (DLA, 1997). The land
reform has so far been market led as the government provides grants to eligi-
ble beneciaries to buy land in the market. However, the reform has shown
little progress both in terms of the amount of land redistributed and the suc-
cess of those who have received land through the reform (Lahi, 2007). The
initial target was to redistribute 30 percent of white owned agricultural land
by 2009, but so far around 4 percent has been redistributed and the deadline
has been moved to 2014. The farms that have been redistributed, called land
reform projects, are to a large degree unproductive or have failed completely
(Hall, 2008). Despite the lack of success, politicians seem devoted to reach
the 30 percent target and there is a call for a radicalisation of the reform to
speed up the process (Lahi, 2007). Since the agricultural sector is the most
important employer of the rural population and an important earner of for-
eign exchange (Lahi, 2007; Hall, 2008), expanding the reform without the
ability of the redistributed projects to engage in productive production could
be devastating for the rural economy and the economy as a whole. A failing
land reform could increase rural poverty and threaten job and food security,
thereby causing opposite results than it was supposed to. Recognising the
political and emotional importance of redistributing land in South Africa, as
well as its economic importance, makes it important to evaluate the reform
and identify criteria for success rather than rejecting it as a failure.
Economic theory recognizes land redistribution as a way to alleviate rural
poverty and promote equality; land is the main asset in the rural sector for
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accumulating wealth and transferring it between generations (Deininger and
Binswanger, 1999). There is also a strong argument that land reform could
be eciency enhancing, increase agricultural productivity and employment.
At the centre of the argument is the so-called stylized fact in development
economics of an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity i.e.
the agricultural sector in developing countries appears to be scale inecient
(Banerjee, 2005). If this is true, there could be a productivity gain in re-
distributing land from large to small farms. The inverse relationship can be
explained by imperfect information causing moral hazard problems; hired
labour will have no incentive to work hard when not supervised properly
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). As large farms rely on hired labour
that must be supervised, they face higher labour costs than small farms that
rely on family labour. Large farms, either organized through private own-
ership, as a collective or under a sharecropping contract will face incentive
problems and the inability of full supervision, which can lead to undersupply
of eort and investment (Deininger, 1995). Small farms on the other hand
use family labour with an incentive to apply optimal level of eort and in-
vestment since they receive the full return to their inputs. In this respect
the land reform in South Africa seems to be counter intuitive. Policy makers
have argued for the preservation of the large-scale commercial sector created
under apartheid when designing the land reform and have restricted the sub-
divisions of farms (Lahi, 2007; Hall, 2008). Under apartheid there were
policies in favour of large mechanized white farms, which created an agricul-
tural sector dominated by a white elite (van Zyl et al., 1995). The argument
for restricting subdivision of farms is the existence of scale economies that
farms under a "viable" economic size are not sustainable (Lahi, 2007; Hall,
2008). Restriction of subdivision means that farms available on the market
are relatively large and grant recipients have to pool their resources together
in order to aord the land available. Others, on the other hand, argue that
the main reason for the low productivity of land reform projects is the fail-
ure to subdivide, because eligible beneciaries do not have the resources or
the necessary skills to manage a mechanised commercial farm (Lahi, 2007).
Van den Brink et al. (1995) argue that the concept of a "viable" farm size is
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not based on economics of scale, but an illusion created by apartheid policies
that made the small-scale sector unproductive for the reason to transform the
small-scale black farmer into wage labour for the white land owner and the
mining industry. It would be unfair to compare the potential of small-scale
farming with a sector that has been discriminated for centuries.
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine if division of land reform projects
into smaller units could be a criterion for success in the South African land
reform. Lack of evidence from existing beneciaries has so far made it im-
possible to analyse the eciency and scale economies of the land reform.
This paper uses data on farms controlled by beneciaries from a cross sec-
tional data set from the quality of life survey (QoL) of 2005 to investigate if
there is an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity for
beneciary farms. An inverse relationship implies that small farms use the
available land more eciently and produce more per unit of land.Then a re-
distribution of land into smaller holdings will be more ecient than keeping
the current agricultural structure intact.
The analysis starts with regressing farm size on land yield, dened as the
value of output per land unit, which is the classical approach to test if there
exists an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Carter,
1984; Heltberg, 1998; Bhalla and Roy, 1988). The literature rejects that there
are technical returns to scale in agricultural production (Binswanger and
Deininger, 1993), and a relationship between farm size and value of output
must then be attributed to market imperfections. Testing whether farm size
has a signicant impact on the value of output is seen as an indirect test for
the presence of market imperfections that lead factor prices to be dependent
on farm size (Bhalla and Roy, 1988). Small farms face lower labour costs,
because they are primarily dependent on family labour. Family members
that work on the farm are stakeholders and therefore have an incentive to
work hard. Wage labour, on the other hand, will have no incentive to apply
eort unless supervised (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Larger farms
face lower capital and land costs as land work as collateral and thereby reduce
the cost of credit. A positive relationship between farm size and land yield
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means that larger farms face lower capital costs osetting the supervision cost
of labour. A negative relationship indicates that labour market imperfections
are dominant that leads labour intensive small farms realising a higher land
yield.
The empirical analysis shows that there is indeed a negative relationship be-
tween farm size and land productivity among the beneciaries of the land
reform. This indicates that small farms are more ecient and that labour
market imperfections are dominant. Critics of the above analysis assert that
the observation of an inverse relationship is caused by unobserved land qual-
ity dierences (Benjamin, 1995). However, when controlling for land quality
and other variables that may bias the results the inverse relationship remains
intact. To test if labour market imperfections are the reason for the results
the analysis is redone only for large farms. If the results are caused by fam-
ily labour on smaller farms the IR should become less signicant since the
entire range of large farms are to a larger degree dependent on hired labour
(Bhalla, 1979). Also noting that irrigation, which is the prime indication for
the ability to use the land intensively (Bhalla, 1979), is positively correlated
with farm size, the conclusion becomes that small farms apply more labour
per land unit and are able to use the available land more extensively. Accord-
ing to this analysis subdivision of land reform projects will increase output,
more of the available land will be used and the projects will create more jobs
in the agricultural sector. The thesis ends with a plea to make smaller land
holding available on the market.
The thesis is organised as follows. The next section outlines the evolution
of the agricultural sector and land reform policy in South Africa. Section 3
describes the theory behind the empirical observation of an inverse relation-
ship. Section 4 gives a review of the literature on the topic of the inverse
relationship and discusses the main critique of the analysis used in this paper.
The data is presented in section 5. In section 6 the econometric methods are
discussed. Section 7 outlines and discusses the results, and nally section 8
concludes and summarizes.
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2 The evolution of South Africa's rural sector
In 1994 the rst democratically elected government of South Africa inherited
one of the most unequal land and income distributions in the world; a white
minority, 10,9% of the population, controlled 86% of total agricultural land
while the African majority was conned to 13% of the territory known as the
homelands. The black population also accounted for a disproportionate share
of the poor (Lahi, 2007). The agricultural sector was, and still is, separated
by means of production as a highly mechanized commercial sector coexists
with black small-scale subsistence oriented farmers. This distinct agricultural
structure is not primarily a product of economies of scale or the abilities of
the white farmer, but a consequence of decades of discriminatory policies, un-
der the apartheid regime, explicitly made to make black small-scale farming
unprotable. The emergence of large-scale white farms was made possible
by articially depressed wages of black workers, the creation of marketing
monopolies, direct transfers and output subsidies (Christiansen and van den
Brink, 1995; Binswanger and Deininger, 1993; Bundy, 1988). In fact, during
the 19th century the African tenant and owner-operated farms were outcom-
peting large-scale farms dependent on hired labour, operated by European
settlers (Christiansen and van den Brink, 1995; Binswanger and Deininger,
1993; Bundy, 1988). The main reason for the comparative advantage of the
African farmer was the simple technology and the large amount of labour
used in production (Christiansen and van den Brink, 1995). In some sectors
the large-scale settler farms were unprotable and could not oer competitive
wages to attract labourers from the small-scale sector. The white large-scale
farm owners argued that labour shortage made it impossible to compete and
lobbied for policies to curb competition from black farmers (Christiansen
and van den Brink, 1995). Limiting access to output and input markets
and restricting areas where Africans could own land eectively restrained
African owner operated farming. As a result of the restrictions on farms
owned by black Africans, tenancy became more pronounced, and at the end
of the 19th century 50% of African farmers were tenants on white owned land
(Christiansen and van den Brink, 1995). Under the tenant system, African
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farmers remained competitive and managed to accumulate wealth and skills,
and became relatively auent and independent, while South Africa's white
farmers became the world leader in receiving government transfers (Chris-
tiansen and van den Brink, 1995). Concerns that the increased wealth of
the African farmers made them dicult to govern and the sharp increase in
labour demand from the emerging mining sector, led to an act that had pro-
found impact on the South African history (Christiansen and van den Brink,
1995).
In 1913, the parliament of the then three-year-old Union of South Africa
passed the Natives Land Act. It was the rst major segregation legislation,
which later set the premises of apartheid. The act formalized by law the bor-
ders of the African reserves and declared that natives, dened as members
of an aboriginal race or tribe of Africa, only had rights to conduct agricul-
tural activities within these reserves (Feinberg, 1993). Over two thirds of
the population were natives and the reserves covered only 7,8% of agricul-
tural land, and the act therefore aggravated the agrarian degradation and led
to further congestion of the African areas (Christiansen and van den Brink,
1995). Agricultural land outside the reserves was reserved for whites, who
represented less than a quarter of the population. Native Africans could not
own, rent or lease land outside the dened areas, which later became known
as the homelands or bantustans (Feinberg, 1993). This meant that Africans
that did productive farming outside the reserves before 1913 lost all their
land rights and were forced to move into the African reserves. Inside the
reserves the natives had no land rights expect cultivation of the land, they
were not allowed to mortgage, sell or freehold the land (Christiansen and
van den Brink, 1995). The major motivation for the law was to transform
African farmers to wage labour for the mining industry and white farms.
Another factor was the wish to curb competition from black farmers and the
racial ideology of keeping the African population under control (Binswanger
and Deininger, 1993). Over the following century many other discriminatory
policies were put in place and the result was to nally eradicate any form of
productive small-scale sector in South Africa. The black rural population lost
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their agricultural capital, farming skills and information base that had been
accumulated over generations (Christiansen and van den Brink, 1995). In this
way the rural sector became dominated by highly mechanised white farms,
despite the historical comparative advantage of labour-intensive production
(Deininger and May, 2000). At a substantial cost, an advanced agricultural
sector had emerged and became the most important employer of the rural
sector. The natives land act was reversed in 1993 and the government elected
in 1994 initiated a land reform programme to try to reverse some of the con-
sequences of the apartheid policies, underpin economic growth, and improve
household welfare (Deininger and May, 2000).
2.1 South Africa's land reform policy
The framework for the land reform policy in South Africa is laid out in The
white paper for land reform (DLA, 1997). The reform is based on three
categories, namely restitution, tenure and redistribution.
Restitution gives legal rights to people that had been forced o their land
after the passing of the natives land act in 1913. People that were wrongfully
evicted from their land are entitled to compensation either in kind or in cash
(Hall, 2008). Tenure reform is aimed at providing all South Africans with
secure property rights, and also recognises the legal rights of occupiers, either
individuals or communities, on private land and state land (Hall, 2008). The
redistribution component is to provide land for landless, labour tenants, farm
workers, as well as new entrants to agriculture.
Redistribution is the most important component of the land reform as it is
expected to make the most substantial contribution and benet the greatest
number of people (Lahi 2007). The redistribution is based on the principle
of "willing seller" and "willing buyer". This means that the seller and buyer
engage in voluntary negotiations and the role of the state is to provide grants
to eligible beneciaries to be able to buy land in the market (Deininger, 1999).
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Until year 2000 a one-time grant of maximum R16001 were made available
for households earning less than R1500 a month (Lahi, 2007). Restrictions
on subdivision, as discussed below, and the relatively large holdings avail-
able on the market as a consequence of the policies described above, forced
beneciaries to pool resources together to be able to buy land. This resulted
in the majority of the land reform projects being farmed collectively (Hall,
2008). The lack of success of the land reform projects up to year 2000 led
to restructuring of the grant system to make it more focused on targeting
emerging black commercial farmers and smaller groups. The income ceiling
was abandoned and own contributions from the beneciaries are required ei-
ther in cash or in kind. The grants are given on a sliding scale depending on
the size of the contribution made by the beneciaries. This has raised the
concern that the land reform is leaving the poor behind; as the grant system
depends on the beneciaries' own contribution it will target people with a
previously strong asset base (Hall, 2008).
2.2 Restrictions on subdivision
The lack of smallholdings on the market is an obvious reason why a market
led land reform is unable to subdivide large farms into small and medium
size farms. The lack of small farms on the market is a consequence of the
agricultural land act of 1970 that restricted agricultural land from being
fragmented into "uneconomic units" (Hall, 2008). The land reform projects
are in fact exempted from the act, however the market consisting of only
potential land reform beneciaries is too small for it to be protable for
large land owners to bear the cost of subdividing their land and selling it
in multiple parcels (Lahi, 2007). In this way the act indirectly restricts
the opportunity of beneciaries to buy small and medium farms. This is
an important obstacle since small-scale land is the most sought after by the
rural poor and landless (Lahi, 2007). As outlined above the reasons for
1Rand (R) is the South African currency. 1 Rand was equal to NOK 0.75 in 2009
(NorgesBank, 2010)
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restricting subdivision of agricultural land were to restrict the emergence of
black small-scale farmers and, as noted by van Zyl et al. (1995), to secure
a minimum income level for the white farmer. The land act was repealed
in 1998, but has still not been signed into law by the President, it has been
argued that this is a result of lobbying from commercial farmers (Hall, 2008).
Institutional and ideological obstacles have prevented subdivision of land
reform projects after they have been acquired in the market (Hall, 2008).
The major obstacle is the general scepticism among ocials in central posi-
tions towards restructuring the agricultural structure. Land reform projects
that propose to subdivide existing farm units or apply for grants to start
small-scale production stand little chance of being accepted, even though the
largest demand is for small-scale production (Lahi, 2007). This scepticism is
based on the belief that productive farming can only be conducted on large-
scale farms and stems from the fact that a large part of the rural population
has never seen a successful and productive small farm because of the distor-
tions imposed under apartheid (Deininger, 1999). This has resulted in large
land reform projects farmed by large groups expected to conduct commercial
farming, usually based on the former use of the land, dependent on heavy
equipment, market access, farming skills and credit supply (Lahi, 2007).
As argued by Lahi (2007) beneciaries have numerous problems accessing
credit markets and lack of credit makes many of these land reform projects
unworkable.
The commercial agricultural sector is highly technical, modern and a sub-
stantial employer while the current small-scale sector is relatively unpro-
ductive. The wish to keep the productive agricultural sector is therefore
understandable. However, as discussed above, decades of discrimination of
the black rural population has led to the loss of agricultural skill and capital
and it may therefore be too optimistic to expect that beneciaries can turn
into commercial farmers overnight. Small-scale and medium-scale production
may be a more ecient and productive approach, at least in the short run.
Recognising these problems has led to a shift of focus to emerging commercial
black farmers and businessmen, perhaps moving the land reform away from
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its goal of rural poverty reduction (Hall, 2008). The continuation of the fo-
cus on large-scale farming is likely to benet a small group of privileged and
may not be labour absorbing, which is crucial for combating rural poverty.
To further examine whether it is warranted to keep the current large-scale
structure intact to uphold the agricultural productivity, the next chapter will
discuss the theory of economies of scale in agricultural production.
3 Theory
The central goals of the land reform in South Africa are the alleviation of
rural poverty and a more equal distribution of assets. A general concern of
the redistribution of income is that a more equal distribution of assets comes
at the expense of economic eciency. This seems to be a major concern for
policy makers in South Africa, measured by their energy used in retaining the
current agrarian structure by restraining subdivisions of large farms. This
implies taking for granted that preservation of large mechanized farms is the
best approach to uphold the agricultural output. Beneciaries are forced
to pool resources together and form large projects organised as cooperatives
due to the limiting size of grants. Retaining large farms may have opposite
eects on productivity if larger farms are associated with lower land produc-
tivity. In the case of land redistribution there is a theoretical possibility to
have both economic eciency and a more egalitarian land distribution. The
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity is a stylized fact in
development economics that postulates that small farms have higher land
productivity than large farms. The argument is usually explained by com-
parative advantage of small-scale agrarian production; small farms produce
more per land unit than large farms, thus land redistribution will alleviate ru-
ral poverty, promote equity and increase production as we have more output
per unit of land on small farms (Heltberg, 1998).
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3.1 The inverse relationship between farm size and out-
put per land unit
There is a large amount of literature on the inverse relationship (IR), and
several papers have concluded that there is a signicant IR. Some of the lit-
erature is discussed below. The existence of an IR has usually been demon-
strated by showing a signicant negative relationship between output per
land unit and farm size. According to Heltberg (1998) the economic causes
for this relationship can be:
 Diseconomies of scale
 Small-scale farmers are more ecient
 Market failures that lead factor prices to be dependent on farm size
The literature on the topic has focused its attention on the last point, which
will also be the focus of this paper. Firstly, there is no reason to believe
that large-scale farmers should be less able to make ecient apportionment
of their resources than small-scale farmers. Larger farms should also have
easier access to inputs and credit, as will be explained below, so most likely
larger farmers should be at least as ecient as beneciaries on smaller farms
(Bhalla, 1979; Heltberg, 1998). Secondly, there is widespread evidence on
constant return to scale (CRS) technology in agricultural production (Berry
and Cline, 1979; Bhalla, 1979; van Zyl et al., 1995; Heltberg, 1998)2
Assuming that we have CRS technology and that there is no reason to be-
lieve that small farmers should be inherently more ecient, according to
standard economic theory there should be no relationship between farm size
and output per land unit. At competitive factor prices and constant returns
to scale, agents will choose optimal factor combinations at every production
level. Since the IR is observed in conjunction with CRS technology, the de-
terminant becomes the behavioural pattern of resource utilization by farm
2See especially Binswanger et al. (1994) for economies of scale in South African agri-
cultural production.
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size (Berry and Cline, 1979). Hence we should turn to asymmetrical market
imperfections to explain the IR.
3.2 Market Imperfections Related to Farm Size
With CRS technology and rational farmers, as we assumed above, input ra-
tios should be constant across farm scale, but if factor prices depend on farm
size the input ratios will be distorted and could lead to a relationship be-
tween output per unit of land and farm size. A theory that incorporates
this aspect is the dualistic model in the rural development literature (Bin-
swanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). The model predicts that the agricultural
sector is divided into two sectors based on size, a modern large-scale sector
and a small-scale traditional sector. The modern sector consists of large-scale
farms that are capital intensive and dependent on hired labour. The farms
are commercial and they maximize prots so all factors of production are
paid their marginal product. The traditional sector consists of small-scale
farms with mostly family labour that use simpler labour intensive production
techniques. Instead of maximizing prots the family farm maximizes output
and shares the output/income between family members as they value income
received by each member of the family. The dualistic structure has emerged
because the modern sector faces higher labour costs, due to the assumed
higher supervision cost of hired labour than family labour, and lower capital
and land costs than the traditional sector. Therefore the modern sector will
apply a lower labour/land ratio than the traditional sector and the eect on
the capital/land ratio is ambiguous and depends on the proportional eect
on land and capital prices as farm size increases (Berry and Cline, 1979).
The observation of an IR is attributed to the presence of labour market
dualism that dominates market imperfections in land and capital markets
(Bhalla, 1979). These market imperfections are further discussed in the next
section. Ceteris paribus, the small-scale farms will have higher output per
land unit than large-scale farms because when faced with lower labour costs
they will apply signicantly more labour per unit of land. They will thus
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be able to cultivate their land more intensively - the same piece of land is
harvested several times in a given year, and more extensively - they cultivate
a higher proportion of the land available to them. The lower capital costs
facing large-scale farmers will somewhat oset the eect of more expensive
labour. The eect on yield depends on two factors. First, which factor mar-
ket imperfection is dominant, that is, which factor price is more sensitive to
farm size. Secondly, it depends on the extent to which labour can be substi-
tuted by capital in production. This dualism, as the modern and traditional
sector face dierent factor prices, can cause distortions in the agricultural
sector's utilization of available land and labour resources (Berry and Cline,
1979). There will be large amounts of labour applied in the traditional sector
as well as scarcity of capital and land, which will lead to very low marginal
productivity of labour. The modern sector will have abundant holdings of
land, leaving large amounts of the land unused (Cornia, 1985). This rela-
tionship is the fundamental rationale behind land reform. Redistributing
underused land on large farms into smaller holdings will take advantage of
the excess labour in the small-scale sector and increase agricultural output.
This duality is a good description of the agricultural sector in South Africa,
where large-scale highly mechanized farms driven by white farmers coexists
with small-scale black family farms. This dual structure will be maintained
as there are restrictions on subdivision of farms. To understand why and how
market imperfections can be dependent on operational scale we will take a
closer look at each factor market in turn.
3.2.1 Labour market imperfections
The small-scale traditional sector is characterized by vast amounts of labour,
which means that labour can be removed from the traditional sector with
very little or no reduction in production. This is called surplus labour (Ray,
1998). Since the marginal productivity of labour (MPL) is higher in the mod-
ern sector we should expect to see a relocation of labour until the marginal
productivities are equalized. When we have a homogenous production func-
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tion, as is assumed in agricultural production, the input ratios should also be
equalized. There are three main reasons why this may not happen according
to Bhalla (1979) 1) The supply price of family labour is equal to the average
product 2) With unemployment the opportunity cost of family labour will
be lower than the wage rate and 3) there are substantial real costs of hired
labour besides the wage rate.
Family farms value positive income received by each member even though
the MPL can be very low or even zero. To clarify, we can assume that each
family labourer receives the average product per unit of labour on the family
farm; the average product will then be the supply price of family labour that
will be equated to the outside wage. The outside wage will be equal to the
MPL on large-scale commercial farms; hence we will observe a higher MPL
and a lower labour/land ratio on large-scale farms than on the family farm
(Berry and Cline, 1979). To maximize the family income it would be rational
to hire out family labour until the MPL is equalised between the sectors. One
obvious reason why this may not happen is that the individual worker will
lose; the individual worker will receive its marginal product on the large farm
foregoing the higher average product on the family farm. On the other hand
the family could compensate the family member that nds work elsewhere
and thereby close the gap between the average and marginal product. This
may not be possible if the family farms pay in kind and have little access
to markets, and thus would not be able to compensate the worker if the job
is in another area. Also with surplus labour it is possible that the market
clearing wage is very low and can be close to the minimum nutritional need
of a worker, making the family farm unwilling to supply family labour to the
market (Berry and Cline, 1979).
The opportunity cost of family labour is the remuneration that the unit of
labour can get from working outside the family farms. With full employment
the opportunity cost would be equal to the going wage rate, which is also the
opportunity cost of hired labour. With unemployment3 this will no longer
hold (Hall, 2008). The opportunity cost of hired labour for the large-scale
3In 2008 The unemployment rate in South Africa was 28,8% (Fund, 2009).
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farmer will still be equal to the going wage rate, but the opportunity cost
of family labour will now be equal to the expected wage, since there is a
probability of being unemployed. This means that the small-scale farmers
will apply a higher labour/land ratio as they face a lower opportunity cost
of labour. To see the argument more clearly a simplied production function
depending on only labour and land, the market wage, w, and the opportunity
cost of family labour, pw, are depicted in gure 1. The opportunity cost of
family labour is the expected wage. As a simplication, assuming that the
wage when unemployed is equal to zero, it is set equal to pw, where p is the
probability of employment which is between zero and one. Assuming CRS
technology the arguments are given in output per unit of land and labour
input per unit of land. Both farms will apply labour until their respective
opportunity cost of labour is equal to the value of marginal product. Assum-
ing that the price is equal to unity, the large-scale farm will apply labour
until the straight wage line W is tangent to the production function and the
family farm will apply labour until the straight line pW is tangent to the
production function.As we see in gure 1 the family farm will apply a higher
labour/land ratio, L**, than the commercial farm, L*. This will result in,
ceteris paribus, a higher output per unit of land than at the large farm.
There is an inherent incentive dierence between family and hired labour
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Family labour is residual claimant of
the farm's output and will thus to a certain degree be fully awarded for their
eorts. In an environment of asymmetric information moral hazard problems
will arise that can substantially increase the cost of hired labour. Given that
the landowner cannot easily observe eort - asymmetric information - workers
on xed wage contracts will have an incentive to shirk - moral hazard. There
can be incentive problems within the household as well, especially for large
families, but the incentive problem will always be less than for hired workers
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Using a piece rate contract instead is
not usually usable in agricultural production, since observing the output of
a worker is not easy in both quantitative and qualitative terms (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1986). This means that hired labour must be supervised
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Figure 1: Per-land unit production function
Source: Ray (1998)
directly to apply optimal amount of eort. The supervision costs that follow
may be substantial, especially in agricultural production that is very spatially
dispersed (van Zyl et al., 1995; Bhalla, 1979). The caveat is that supervision
costs tend to be dependent on farm size. On family farms and small scale-
farms that are mainly dependent on family labour, which can also perform
supervision tasks without extra costs (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; van
Zyl et al., 1995), the supervision costs are minimal, but as farm size increases
and hired labour becomes dominant supervision costs will increase as well. In
fact supervision costs are sucient to make labour costs increase with farm
size (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986; van Zyl et al., 1995). This means
that the larger farm size the higher labour costs, which explains the lower
labour input per land unit on larger farms. This can be shown in gure (1),
by simply assuming that large-scale farmers face an eective wage, sW, where
s is the supervision cost that is larger than unity. This means that large-scale
farmers face an eective wage that exceeds the market wage, and they will
consequently apply L amounts of labour per land unit.
However, increasing labour costs with farm size is not sucient for observing
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an IR (Bhalla, 1979; Heltberg, 1998). For instance, in the presence of the
labour market imperfections explained above we should expect a reallocation
of land through the rental or sales market until the output per land unit are
equalised. Larger landowners will gain if they rent out parcels of land to small
holders, and the smallholder will gain from renting the land, thus operational
holdings should move towards a more optimal operational size (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1986). In order to observe an IR, we thus need to have
market imperfections in at least two factor markets.
3.2.2 Land market imperfections
If it is possible to rent out land with a xed rent contract, it would circumvent
the moral hazard problems observed above. The tenant will receive the whole
value of his eort and will thus apply optimal amount of eort. However if
the tenant is risk averse and/or credit constrained the contract will not be
accepted, and it will not be possible to oer an incentive optimal contract
(Ray, 1998). Agricultural production is risky business; a storm can destroy
a whole year worth of output (Bhalla, 1979), thus if the tenant is risk averse
he needs to be compensated for the risk involved. In addition, if the tenant is
credit constrained he will not be able to pay the rent before harvest, and only
able to pay if the harvest is successful, thereby increasing the cost compared
to owner operated holding. One option could be a risk-sharing contract,
where the owner takes a part of the actual harvest. However, a sharecropping
contract involves the same incentive ineciencies as above. Since the tenant
will not receive the whole benet of the eort put into the farm, he does not
have an incentive to use the ecient amount of inputs, which is known as the
Marshallian ineciency (Ray, 1998). This will limit the extent to which the
rental market can equalize the land distribution since the expected return to
self-cultivation is higher than the expected return from hiring out the land
(Heltberg, 1998).
Heltberg (1998) gives four reasons why the land sales market is insucient
to reallocate land into smaller holdings. Firstly, land markets can be prac-
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tically non-existent in some parts of the world, for example, there can be
ocial polices that restrict the functioning of the land market. As previ-
ously discussed, for land reform beneciaries there are institutional obstacles
to subdivide land reform farms into smaller parcels and selling the parts on
the market, making it impossible for a functioning land market to equal-
ize land holdings. Secondly, small-scale farmers can be severely credit con-
strained making it impossible to acquire land at market prices. Beneciaries
get grants from the government to buy land, but as long as the farm sizes
are kept intact, it will not make farm sizes smaller. Thirdly, historically it
is observed that government interventions in input and output markets are
biased towards large-scale farming. In South Africa the current agricultural
sector has evolved after decades of government policies favouring large-scale
farming over small-scale farming, and thus the available farms on the market
are above average large and the land reform will only maintain the current
structure. Finally, land holdings can also be seen as an asset for landown-
ers both as collateral and for prestige purposes. This will tend to worsen
the distribution of land and leave a large amount of agricultural land idle.
Land market imperfections together with labour market imperfections are
sucient to induce an IR (Heltberg, 1998).
3.2.3 Credit market imperfections
Credit market imperfections are a source of another inverse relationship that
can further skew the distribution of labour and land. There is likely to be
an inverse relationship between the costs of capital and land and farm size.
This is because land can be used as collateral; in the rural setting, land
can be the most important asset and maybe the only form of collateral, and
thereby reduce the cost of credit necessary to buy land and capital equipment.
The large-scale farmer will have easier access to liquidity to buy machinery,
invest in land improvements, high quality seeds and so forth (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig, 1986). The large-scale farmer will tend to substitute the
relatively expensive labour for the relatively cheaper capital and thereby
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exacerbate the dierence in labour/land ratio between large and small farms.
Whether higher capital input on large farms will increase the output per land
unit compared to small farms depends on the relative decrease of land and
capital prices as farms size increases, the substitutability between capital
and land, and the substitutability between capital and labour (Berry and
Cline, 1979). When we have a CRS production function depending on labour,
capital and land, output per land unit will only depend on labour and capital
input per unit of land. The eect of a lower price of capital and land on
output per land unit will depend on the relative proportional decrease in
the prices and also the substitution relationship. If land and capital are
substitutes, cheaper capital will increase the intensity of capital and thereby
counteract the lower labour intensity as farm size increases. The eect on
output per land unit will then depend on the strength of the opposite forces.
If we observe a negative relationship then labour market imperfections are
dominant, and if capital market imperfections are dominant we would expect
to see a increasing relationship between farm size and output per land unit
(Bhalla, 1979).
4 Literature review
The empirical observation, through numerous studies, of a negative relation-
ship between farm size and land productivity has become a stylized fact in
development economics and a major argument for land reforms that equalize
land distribution. The presence of an inverse relationship has usually been
shown by nding a signicant negative relationship between value of output
per land unit and farm size in the following equation (Carter, 1984; Bhalla
and Roy, 1988):
yi = 0 + 1hi + i (1)
where y is the log of land yield (value of output per land unit) and h is the log
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of farm size. The theoretical explanation is that factor prices are dependent
on farms size leading to a dierence in factor inputs between large and small
farms. Whether farm size signicantly inuences land yield is seen as an
indirect test for the importance of labour market dualism (Bhalla and Roy,
1988). Small farms face lower labour costs and will thus apply more labour
per unit of land which will lead to the land being used more intensively and
extensively, resulting in higher output per land unit than on large farms.
The "stylized fact" remains highly controversial and contested. The main
objection is the assumed exogeneity of farm size; if farms size is correlated
with an omitted variable that explains output per land unit, the observed
negative relationship, the coecient in front of farm size, will be biased. The
literature on the IR can be divided into early studies, where the negative
relationship is observed, and later studies where the focus is on methods for
securing the exogeneity of farm size.
4.1 Early Studies
A seminal work of Berry and Cline (1979) was one of the rst studies to
analyse the IR econometrically (Leiserson and Bhalla, 1979). They used
cross-sectional data on two land abundant countries from Latin America
and four land scarce countries from Asia - Brazil, Colombia, the Philippines,
Pakistan, India and Malaysia. For all countries they regressed value of output
per land unit on farm size nding a signicant negative relationship between
output per land unit and farm size. This is used as evidence of the superiority
of small-scale farming and recognition of land redistribution as a way to
achieve higher agricultural yields. To measure the eect of land redistribution
they compare an estimated output per farm area with the actual average
output per farm area for each country. The estimate is made by dividing the
total farm land available by the total number of families in the rural labour
force and using the estimated output per land unit on the resulting farm
size. This gives an estimate for the post reform agricultural output per farm
area. Out of this crude empirical exercise all countries analysed experience
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higher percentage output from the hypothetical land redistribution. The
range is from a 10% increase for West Pakistan to a 28% increase for the
land abundant country Colombia. This leads to the conclusion that there is
a prospect for land reform for both land scarce and land abundant countries.
Land abundant countries achieve an increase because a redistribution of land
will lead to higher shares of land cultivated, while land scarce countries will
achieve the same eects, but not as strong, because the cropping ratios will
increase. For both types of countries this is possible because of the cheap
labour faced by small farms, labour market dualism, which is concluded
after observing a negative relationship between the labour/land ratio and
farm size.
Cornia (1985) also recommends land redistribution in the presence of surplus
labour; in an environment of surplus labour, land redistribution will achieve
higher agricultural output, absorb labour, and alleviate rural poverty. The
author falls to this conclusion after regressions of equation 1 using cross-
sectional farm level data from 15 developing countries, and nding a signif-
icant IR for 12 of the countries. Three of the countries have insignicant
results, which, according to the author, is because of a limited number of ob-
servations and scanty data. For the twelve countries with signicant results
the elasticity of land yield with respect to farm size ranges from -0.74 (for
Uganda) to -0.18 (for India). All, except one elasticity that is signicant at
over 80% level of probability, are signicant at over 90% level of probability.
The elasticities for the land abundant countries are larger in absolute value.
The signicant IR is attributed to higher land use intensity on small farms,
which is possible as they use both capital and labour more intensively, shown
by nding negative labour and capital elasticities with respect to farm size.
The negative elasticity of capital is as strong as the elasticity of labour in
this study, but according to theory small farms should face higher capital
costs than larger farms and capital use intensity will depend on the relative
strength of the change in land and capital prices. This is explained by the
author by the fact that the capital term used also contains capital equip-
ment produced on the farm, which is higher on small farms because of the
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higher labour use, and that larger farms on average have lower capital/land
ratio as a consequence of low rate of utilization of the farm area. The study
is inadequate as it fails to control for land productivity; if larger farms are
characterized by systematically lower land quality the observed IR will be
overstated.
4.2 Is farm size endogenous?
As mentioned, if there is a non-random relationship between farm size and
other variables that determine output per land unit, for example soil quality,
irrigation, or product mix, the results will be biased and an observed IR can
be attributed to some other exogenous variable. For instance, if soil quality
is negatively correlated with farm size, i.e. larger farms have systematically
lower soil quality than small farms, the observed IR can be a result of ex-
ogenous soil quality variables and land redistribution will not be eciency
enhancing. The exogeneity of farm size is the main theme in Carter (1984),
Bhalla and Roy (1988), Benjamin (1995) and Heltberg (1998). Carter uses
a panel dataset where each holding is observed at least twice over a 3-year
period. Each holding is identied by its village location making it possible to
use village xed eects to control for intervillage dierences in land quality.
Heltberg (1998) expands the xed eects approach by controlling for house-
hold xed eects, which controls unobserved farm heterogeneity, using farm-
level panel data from Pakistan. Bhalla and Roy (1988) use a cross-sectional
dataset from India with detailed data on soil fertility for the observed farms.
Benjamin (1995) asserts that regression of equation (1) suers from omitted
variable bias when land quality is unobservable which entails the necessity
for using the instrumental variables estimator.
Both Carter (1984) and Bhalla and Roy (1988) use farm level data from
India, but end up with widely dierent results, even though both papers nd
a highly signicant IR when regressing equation (1). Carter expands the
model by including a constant,i , for each village i in equation (1)
22
yij = i + 1hij + ij (2)
where y and h are land yield and farm size for holding j in village i. As-
suming that the average soil quality within villages is relatively constant
over the sample period,i, controls for land quality that is specic to each
village. If the village specic land quality is not independent of the land
distribution within each village, the estimate of 1 in equation (1) will be
biased. The hypothesis presented postulates that villages with high land
quality will experience higher population growth, leading to a subdivision of
land into smallholdings. Then village specic land quality will be negatively
correlated with farm size and the IR would disappear or be diminished in
equation (2). Carter nds that village specic eects explain a substantial
amount of variation in land quality, but do not substantially diminish the
IR observed in the original model.4 Bhalla and Roy (1988) argue that the
ndings in Carter (1984) remain unconvincing because the data is from only
one region in India and he lacks direct information on land quality. Bhalla
and Roy (1988) rst estimate a linear-log specication of equation (1) for
seventeen states in India. This simple model nds a signicant IR in 97% of
the states. To test if the IR holds where the land quality is more homogenous
the model is divided into 78 agronomic zones. In this model the signicant
IR drops to 69% of the states. The model is further expanded by including
soil type, soil colour, soil depth and the fraction of irrigated land as control
variables for land quality. In this case only 44% of the cases have an IR. To
get even a greater homogeneity, controls for both climatic and soil charac-
teristics are added and the model is divided into 176 districts. In this model
only 29% of the districts have signicant IR. The extensive measures used
here to control for land quality show that the IR model can suer from omit-
ted variable bias, and show the importance of controlling for land quality.
However, by dividing the sample into 176 districts to secure optimal homo-
geneity of land quality, the number of observations is substantially reduced
for each regression. The authors recognize this problem and the minimum
41 increases from -0,393 to -0.337, the change is not statistically signicant.
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number of observations were set to 40. Still, the lack of observations may
have contributed to the declining signicance of farm size in explaining land
yield. Despite this objection the study shows the importance of controlling
for land quality. It is rather rare to have detailed data on soil type, soil colour
and soil depth, it is more usual to use indirect variables to control for land
quality, as for instance the land's price, which will be discussed later.
Benjamin (1995) uses cross-sectional data from Java and nds a signicant
IR when using a model like equation (1). He then substitutes farm size with
area actually harvested, arguing that farm size is only an imperfect measure
of land input, and nds that the IR is still signicant but diminished. The
problem with this approach is that it eliminates the ineciency of underuti-
lizing productive land; if large farms use on average less of their available
land that is suitable for cultivation then this is an ineciency that should
be accounted for. Berry and Cline (1979) note that it is perfectly consistent
with the IR theory for the yield on area harvested to be higher on large farms
than on small, because a smaller part of the available land is harvested on
large farms. On the other hand, using farm size is imperfect as it also in-
cludes non-arable land, but this is solved in Berry and Cline (1979) by using
land available for cultivation. The main point in Benjamin (1995) is that
farm size in equations like 1 is endogenous when land quality is not included
as a control variable. To correct for the bias various measures of population
density, taking advantage of the hypothesis in Carter (1984) that higher pop-
ulation density should be negatively correlated with farm size, are used as
instrumental variables to predict farm size. When predicted farm size is used
as regression variable the IR vanishes, and it leads to the conclusion that the
observed IR is due to unobservable variables. There are two major problems
with this conclusion, which is also noted in Heltberg (1998). Firstly, the
sample contains relatively homogenous farms, most farms are under 2 ha, so
it is expected that the relationship is weaker. Secondly, the instruments used
explain little of the variation of farm size; 0,14 is the highest R2 obtained
between farm size and its instruments, indicating that the instruments used
may not be relevant for explaining farm size. If instruments are weak i.e.
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they explain little of the variation in farm size, the instrumental variable
estimator is no longer reliable (Stock and Watson, 2007).
To control for unobserved farm heterogeneity Heltberg (1998) uses a xed ef-
fects model on farm-level panel data from Pakistan. He expands equation (1)
by including a dummy variable for each farm and for each year in the sample
period. The farm dummies will control for farm specic land quality that
does not vary over time. The year dummies will control for factors that vary
over time but not across farms, such as weather. The results strongly sup-
port the existence of an IR, indicating that farm specic land quality does
not eliminate the existence of an IR. However, the model does not control
for dierences in land quality and other unobserved variables that are time
variant, a concern also expressed by the author. Further nding that labour
use signicantly decreases with farm size, the observed IR is attributed to
higher labour intensity on small farms.
4.3 Evidence from South Africa
As explained in the previous chapter the agricultural sector in South Africa
is characterised by a large-scale commercial sector and a small-scale tradi-
tional sector. Van den Brink et al. (1995) point out that it would be unfair
to compare the productivity of the commercial sector with the traditional
sector because of the discriminatory policies against the latter. It has also
been impossible to do so due to the general lack of data on the traditional sec-
tor. However, the authors refer to some case studies where black small-scale
producers were not facing severe discrimination, and these studies concluded
that small-scale farms were more ecient. Van Zyl et al. (1995) analyse the
relationship between farm size and total factor productivity within the sec-
tors instead of analysing between them. They nd that smaller farms, in the
commercial sector, are generally more ecient and that they use a relatively
more labour intensive production technique. However, they nd that farms
in the former homelands seems to be scale inecient, although the results
should be treated with caution because all farms are relatively small. This
25
result is not surprising, as it was a part of the Apartheid system to make
small-scale farmers in the homelands unable to be self-sucient so that they
were forced to seek outside work (Deininger and May, 2000).
In the context of the current land reform the question of whether an IR exists
in the South African agricultural sector is highly relevant. The available data
makes it possible to undertake an empirical analysis, while keeping in mind
the problems from previous studies. The data will be described in the next
section. The econometric specication and suggestions for solving a potential
endogeneity problem are discussed in section 6.
5 Data
The data used for the empirical analysis in this paper is a cross-sectional
dataset from the Quality of Life (QoL) Survey made by the South African
Land Reform Program in 2005. The dataset is explicitly collected for the pur-
pose of monitoring and evaluating the land reform, and is described in May
et al. (2008). The dataset includes observations from 2002 beneciary house-
holds and is thus ideal for analysing the comparative advantage of small-scale
compared to large-scale farms managed by beneciaries, and whether this
should have consequences for the land redistribution policies. The thesis is
also to a minor degree based on qualitative data gathered on a eld trip in
South Africa with Julian May, professor in economics at the University of
KwaZulu-Natal, and Henrik Wiig, researcher at NIBR, October 2009. The
qualitative data are based on re-interviews of 16 projects from the original
sample of the QoL data set.
Data was collected at the household level and at the community level5. The
survey included a sample of beneciaries, households and communities that
have received land trough the reform, and an "identical" control group in
order to do valid impact assessment analysis. However this is not relevant
5The following section is based on (May et al., 2008).
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for the analysis in this paper and shall not be further dwelled upon. The
sample includes 3716 households; 2002 households that have received land
through the land reform (beneciaries) and 1714 control households. My
purpose in this thesis is to analyse if there exists an inverse relationship be-
tween land yield and farm size on the farms that are run by households and
communities that have received land trough the land reform. Therefore only
data from the beneciary households and communities will be used in the
analysis. The sample selection process follows a probability proportional to
size technique; the selection probability for a project is proportional to its
size. This is to ensure that households in larger projects have equal probabil-
ity of being surveyed as households in smaller projects. Twelve households
were then randomly selected within each project. The sample includes ben-
eciaries from all programs of the land reform, thus the sample should be
representative of the population of eligible beneciaries.
In the questionnaire respondents have listed all plots they have access to and
classied them into one of four categories:
1. Private land, not part of the land reform
2. Project land, used individually, individuals retain output
3. Project land, used collectively, individuals retain output
4. Project land, used collectively, collective share output
The rst category is private land that beneciaries have access to outside
the land reform. The next three categories are land that beneciaries have
gained access to through the land reform i.e. project land. Project land
that is privately run falls under category 2. On this land individuals decide
what to plant and when, provide all inputs, and receive all crops and prots.
Category 3 is land where a group owns the land, decide what to plant and
when, and provides inputs, but individuals provide labour and receive all
output and prot. The last category is collectively driven plots where the
group provides all inputs and shares all output and prots.
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The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the relationship between farm
size and land productivity, so the relevant observation unit will be farms
consisting of plots that are classied into one of the four categories. This has
been done by adding together plot characteristics within category 1 and 2
for each household, and within category 3 and 4 for each project6 The data
will then be on the farm level and each observation will be classied into
one of the four categories that will represent the dierent farm types in this
paper. An advantage of this approach is that it is possible to analyse the
eect of the dierent organisational forms on land yield. Unfortunately, data
on input use was not linked to the plots in the data collection and input
use at the farm level is therefore not observed. This means that analyses of
the dierences in input use must be done indirectly, as shown in the results
section.
After identifying observations with crop production and deleting extreme
values, the sample contains observations from 571 farms. As much as 26%
of the observations have missing values, but instead of deleting a substantial
part of the data material, missing values were substituted by the mean from
the available data. The advantages of mean substitution are that it keeps the
mean of the sample intact, it is conservative, and it is the best guess without
any further information (Fidell and Tabachnick, 2007). The major drawbacks
are that the variance and the covariance of the variables will be deated as
more observations with mean values will decrease the variation of the sample.
All regressions done below will be repeated with only the complete cases and
if the results are similar, we can be condent in their predictions (Fidell and
Tabachnick, 2007). The results for the complete cases are shown in appendix
A. Summary statistics for all variables are included in table 1.
6For example, if a household has access to two private plots (category 1) and one project
plot privately driven (category 2) then the size of category 1 plots are added together and
the value of harvest are added together; these two plots then represents one privately
driven farm. The category 2 plot represents one privately run project farm. The same is
done for collective plots; if a project has access to two collective plots (category 4) then
the size and value of output for the plot are added together and represent one collective
farm.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Y 72539 463685
Yfs 12446 35530
Yop 25877 57951
Yland 207121 694056
Ylandop 271414 606400
FS 112.27 395.46
OP 46.27 188.307
I 0.060 0.22
N 571
Y is the value of crop production7, reported in Rands. Y is calculated by
multiplying the harvest of each crop for the agricultural year of 2005 by
their respective mean price. This implies assuming that there are no price
dierentials between farms i.e. that the "law of one price" holds within
the survey. This is clearly not satisfactory since it is very likely that there
is regional and local price dierentiation due to quality dierences between
crops - non-homogenous products - and local market imperfections (Chavas
and Aliber, 1993). It would have been an improvement to use region specic
prices, thereby allowing price dierentials at the regional level, however this
was not possible due to data scarcity8. By using a monetary value of land
quality as a control variable there is a correction of productivity dierences
due to price dierences and the argument falls down to assuming fairly well
functioning markets (van Zyl et al., 1995).
Farm size (FS) is the total size of the farm, denoted in hectares. Operated
area (OP) is dened as the area used for crop production, denoted in hectares.
It is equal to total farm size minus land that is not used for cultivation of
7There are 25 dierent crops cultivated by the beneciaries, 67% of households reports
growing more than two crop types and 20% grows more than four (May et al., 2008). The
variable of interest here is the total value of crops harvested, so the composition of Y will
not be of interest.
8With regional prices we would have no observations from Limpopo and Guateng
provinces since there are no registrations of crop sales from these provinces. We would
have no observations on private farms either, since the location of private farms is not
registered.
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crops. Yland is the value in Rands of the operated area. Ylandop is the value
in Rands per unit of operated area. I is the proportion of operated land that
is irrigated. As is seen in table 1 the mean of I is very low. The low means
is partly because 719 of the farms, 93% of the sample, have no irrigation.
5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of the dataset
This paper tries to analyse whether small-scale farms that are part of the
land reform have a comparative advantage in crop production. The great
advantage, as previously mentioned, is that the data are on the beneciaries,
and should be a representative sample of the population of interest. This
is a large survey with available data on several issues, however, a large sur-
vey increases the chance of data error, both due to inaccurate knowledge of
the respondent and the increased diculty of processing the large amount of
data (May et al., 2008). A direct consequence of this is the large number of
missing observations and extreme values. This makes the data cleaning pro-
cess dicult and subject to uncertainty. Therefore the analysis is repeated
including observations that were interpreted as extreme values in the main
analysis. The results are reported in appendix A. A complete panel data set
would have been advantageous as it would allow controlling for farm xed
eects such as land quality dierences that are constant over time, ability of
the farmers, and location. It would also allow controlling for unobserved fac-
tors that varies over time but not across farms, such as year specic weather
conditions.
6 Econometric specication
To test the hypothesis of an IR in the South African land redistribution, I
will use the described farm level data from farms that are controlled by land
reform beneciaries.
30
6.1 The classical IR model
The conventional approach to empirically test the IR is to use ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation on the following equation (Heltberg, 1998; Carter,
1984; Bhalla and Roy, 1988):
ln
Yi
FSi
= 0 + 1lnFSi + i (3)
Yi is the value of output for farm i.FSi is the farm size of farm i measured in
hectares and 0 is a constant term. The parameter of interest,1 , measures
the elasticity of value of output per land unit with respect to farm size. i is
an error term that represents all other variables that determine land yield.
The OLS estimator will be best linear unbiased (BLUE) if the following
assumptions hold (Biørn, 2003)
E(i|FSi) = 0 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n (4)
E(ij|FSi) =
8<:2 for i = j0 for i 6= j (5)
The rst assumption implies that the correlation between the disturbance
and farm size are uncorrelated and that the expected value of the disturbance
term is equal to zero. The second assumption implies that the variances of
the error terms are constant and equal to 2, i.e. homoskedastic errors, and
that the disturbances from dierent observations are uncorrelated, i.e. no
autocorrelation.
Equation (3) assumes that farmers have chosen optimal factor combinations
and given CRS technology and identical factor prices for all farms, 1 should
be equal to zero (Bhalla and Roy, 1988). If 1 is signicantly dierent from
zero there is an abnormality to explain. The impact of farm size on land yield
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is seen as an indirect test for the market imperfections explained above. If
capital market imperfections dominate we will have high capital/land ratios
on large farms osetting the labour market imperfections and we should ex-
pect 1 to be positive. If labour and land market imperfections are dominant
there will be a tendency towards labour intensive small-scale farms that are
able to use the available land more extensively and intensively than large-
scale farms characterised with idle land. In this case we should expect 1 to
be negative and we have an IR (Bhalla, 1979).
The main objection to equation (3) is the assumption of exogeneity of farm
size i.e. a violation of assumption (4). According to Bhalla (1979) assump-
tion (4) holds if FS is independent of land quality, the proportion of the farm
that is unusable land, and product mix.
6.2 Extending the model
We have omitted variable bias when an omitted variable is correlated with an
explanatory variable, FS in model (3), and explains part of the dependent
variable, land yield in model (3). In the presence of omitted variable bias
assumption (4) is violated and the OLS estimate ^1 will be biased. This
is because FS will take credit for some of the variation in the dependent
variable that is attributable to the variable left out of the analysis (Kennedy,
2007). The direction of the bias will depend on the correlation between the
error term and FS; if an omitted variable is positively correlated with land
yield and negatively correlated with farm size, ^1 will have a downward bias.
One solution to the problem is to include the problem variables as controls
into the analysis. Then equation (3) becomes
ln
Yi
FSi
= 0 + 1lnFSi + 
0Xi + i (6)
where 0 is a row vector of coecients for the column vector of control vari-
ables Xi . This is a multiple regression model and the following assumptions
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must hold for the OLS estimator to be BLUE
E(i|FSi; Xi) = 0 for i = 1; 2; : : : ; n (7)
E(ij|FSi; Xi) =
8<:2 for i = j0 for i 6= j (8)
In addition, the regressors cannot be linearly dependent i.e. no perfect mul-
ticollinearity (Biørn, 2003).
6.2.1 Land unsuitable for cultivation
A concern is that the existence of large farms is due to the fact that they
are situated in remote areas where there is no real basis for agricultural pro-
duction.9 One hypothesis is that areas with a high proportion of land that
is unsuitable for agricultural production would experience low population
growth and less pressure for subdividing land holdings (Carter, 1984). If
larger farms have a higher proportion of unusable land the value of output
per land unit will be understated as the variable FS incorporates the whole
spectre of land types. Then if the relationship is non-random, i.e. the propor-
tion of unusable land increases as farm size increases, 1 will have a negative
downward bias. The easiest way to control for unusable land, according to
Bhalla (1979) is to replace FS in equation (3) with operated area OP , which
is the land used for cultivation. This gives equation (9)
ln
Yi
OPi
= 0 + 1lnOPi + i (9)
1 is now the elasticity of land yield with respect to operated area, a negative
value will, of course, also here imply an IR.
9For instance, a 258-hectare large land reform project interviewed on the eld trip had
only 4 hectare of usable land.
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6.2.2 Land quality
The main objection to both equation (3) and (9) is that if larger farms are
characterized by systematically lower land quality this feature explains the
IR. Such a relationship will cause a downward bias on ^1. A hypothesis
repeated in previous literature that may explain a non-random relationship
between farm size and land quality is that larger farms are put together of
low quality parcels from small farms. This is caused by distress sales by
credit constrained small farmers that rst and foremost will sell the part of
their land that is of lower quality (Bhalla and Roy, 1988). Therefore a study
that uses land yield as a dependent variable should incorporate land quality
into the analysis (Bhalla, 1979).
The best method to control for land quality would be to have information on
soil type, soil colour and soil depth, variables that directly explain land qual-
ity, but the lack of these variables necessitates the use of a proxy variable.
The principal indicator of land quality is the price of land that should both
reect inherent quality dierences and location of the land (Berry and Cline,
1979). There are two problems of using land price as a proxy for land qual-
ity. First, if the price not only reects quality dierences, but also reects
expected output that is based on previous realised yields, then the land price
will depend on the expected land yield and this would lead to correlation
between the error term and land price. Secondly, the land price as a quality
term may be biased in favour of small farms. If there are more potential
buyers for smallholdings the land price per hectare will then be higher for
small farms than for large farms creating an illusion of higher quality land on
small farms. These two eects work in opposite directions and may balance.
Either way, leaving out a control variable for land quality can bias the re-
sults, so using the land price and assuming that the price mainly reects land
quality dierences is defendable (Bhalla, 1979). Equation (10) incorporates
the land price per operated area as a control for land quality
ln
Yi
OPi
= 0 + 1lnOPi + 1lnQi + i (10)
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Q is equal to the value of land per hectare of operated land, 1 will be the
elasticity of land yield with respect to land quality. This means that a 1%
increase in Q will lead to 1% increase in land yield holding operated area
constant. 1 is the percentage change in land yield when operational area
increases with 1% holding land quality constant.
An important determinant of land yield is the availability of irrigation. Irri-
gation makes it possible to have a higher cropping intensity and also to have
production during the dry season. If small farms have a higher proportion of
irrigated land than large farms, then this will also cause a downward bias on
1, and possibly an observed IR can be the result of higher land area under
irrigation for small farms. To control for the irrigation eect on land yield
the variable I will be introduced as the proportion of cultivated area under
irrigation in equation (11)
ln
Yi
OPi
= 0 + 1lnOPi + 1lnQi + 2lnIi + i (11)
In Bhalla (1979) model (11 is seen as an extreme test of the IR as the question
to be asked is why small-scale farmers irrigate more of their land than large-
scale farmers. Then if model (11) drastically alters the conclusions for the
precedent models, the question that needs to be asked is why irrigation is
disproportionally distributed along the production scale.
6.2.3 Product mix
Another feature that may cause a downward bias on the relationship between
land yield and farm size is if large farms systematically cultivate low valued
crops that need more land and less of the relatively expensive labour per
unit of output. One way to control for a supposed shift in product mix
as farm size increases is to regress the above models within a crop sector,
for example to analyse the models only for farms producing maize. The
data used here is not suitable for separating farms into dierent sectors as
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67% of all households have reported to produce more than two crops (May
et al., 2008). Even if it was possible to separate farms into dierent sectors
it may not be the best approach since crop mix itself can be a response to
the discussed market imperfections (Benjamin, 1995). Holding product mix
constant will neutralize the ineciencies caused by large farms shifting to
crops that need less labour and more land which gives low values of output
per land unit.
Berry and Cline (1979) argue that equations (10) and (11) are a more ac-
curate way to control for the shifting of product mix. The argument is that
evaluating the value of output achieved relative to available land and con-
trolling for land quality leaves no reason to believe that there should be a
systematic dierence in cropping patterns between large-scale and small-scale
farms. Keeping unusable land and land quality constant farmers independent
of scale will choose the product mix that maximizes value of output per land
unit. If there are market imperfections that lead large farms to shift to crops
that are less intensive in the relatively more expensive inputs and give low
value of output per land unit, the land will not be used to its full potential.
This is an ineciency that should be captured in the model.
6.2.4 Organisational form
"How do you organize 100 people?" A manager of a land reform farm
cooperative used this rhetoric question to answer why a 94-hectare large
farm is only using 19 hectares for production. He further explains that
they were originally ve brothers with families that applied for grants
to buy a farm but the application was allegedly denied because they were
too few potential beneciaries. After they managed to get together a
group of 100 people with more or less loose connections the application
was granted.
This is one of several similar stories told by land reform beneciaries when
they were interviewed in October 2009. This story gives reasons to suspect
that there may be a relationship between organizational form and farm size.
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Restrictions on subdivision of farms, relatively large farms on the market,
and the small size of grants may have forced beneciaries to form groups to
be able to acquire farms through the land reform. These groups seemed to
have major management problems and conicts relating to investment deci-
sions and the division of the workload. As larger farms are more expensive
there is a chance that a higher proportion of large farms will be organized as
collectives. Depending on the eciency of dierent organizational forms can
this cause a bias on the estimated elasticity in the models presented above.
(Deininger, 1995) argues that agricultural collectives are far less ecient than
independent family farms because members of collectives will not face the full
reward of their actions and this will lead to undersupply of eort and invest-
ment. If this is true and a higher proportion of large farms in the sample
are organised as collectives then this could lead to downward bias on ^1 .
On the other hand Platteau (1995) claims that some forms of cooperative
land management are superior to private farms. It is further argued that for
sub-Saharan Africa this applies to community farms with communal prop-
erty rights to agricultural land. Indigenous communities gaining property
rights to land that is historically viewed as communal land may have well
developed community institutions, organisational policies and trust amongst
community members. This may enable them to pool their resources together,
eciently divide the workload and have a greater scope of labour specialisa-
tion. To control for organisational form I have included dummies for category
1,2 and 4 into equation (11).
ln
Yi
OPi
= 0+1lnOPi+1lnQi+2lnIi+3Dpri+4Dpriprj+5Dcoll+ i
(12)
Dpri is the dummy variable for privately run farms, it takes the value of
one if farm i is privately run and zero otherwise.Dcoll and Dprjpri is de-
ned likewise respectively for collectively and private run project farms. A
dummy for category 2 is omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. 3 is
then the average dierence between private farms' and category 2 farms' log
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of land yield, keeping operational size, land quality and irrigation constant.
There are similar interpretations for 4 and 5. Equation (12) also gives a
formal test of the claim given in Deininger (1995) that large farms, either
organised privately or collective, will face the same problems that lead to
an inverse relationship, since 1 now reects the land elasticity with respect
to operational area keeping organizational form constant. The result of the
econometric analysis are presented in the next section.
7 Results and discussion
Five models were estimated, based on equations (3)- (12), respectively. The
results for model 1-5 are presented in column 1-5 in table 2. The regression of
model 1 gives a highly signicant negative estimate of 1 equal to -0,77 which
means that a 1% increase in farm size will on average lead to a 0,77% drop
in land yield. The R2, which in this simple model is equal to the squared
of the correlation coecient between land yield and farm size, is equal to
0,49. Without attracting too much attention to this measure it seems that
farm size can explain a substantial part of the variation in land yield. If farm
size is independent of exogenous factors that explain land yield the negative
coecient will reect dierence in input intensities leading to more intensive
and/or extensive land use on small farms. Subdividing farms in the land
reform into smaller holdings would increase agricultural output and if the
IR is a result of intensive labour use of small farms, as theory postulates, it
would also increase labour demand.
Replacing farm size with land suitable for cultivation to control for non-arable
land the results remains practically unchanged. This implies that there is no
reason to believe that larger farms should have a larger proportion of unusable
land. In any case operational area will be used in subsequent models, as it
is land yield from crop production that is to be explained.
Introducing a control variable for land quality should, as explained above,
control for shifts in product mix and a non-random relationship between
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Table 2: Regression results for log of land yield
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lnFS -0.773
(-21.51)
lnOP -0.714 -0.614 -0.638 -0.691
(-21.08) (-13.26) (-13.52) (-14.37)
lnQ 0.177 0.17 0.157
(3.12) (2.99) (2.83)
DI 0.995 0.18
(2.35) (0.459)
Dpri -0.31
(-0.33)
Dprjpri 0.21
(0.22)
Dcoll 1.596
(1.64)
R2 0.486 0.476 0.487 0.493 0.513
adj:R2 0.484 0.489 0.507
t-statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
Constant term included, but not reported
farm size and land quality. The elasticity drops to -0,614 but is still highly
signicant. This implies that large farms are characterized by on average
lower land quality than small farms, and that the consequent shift in product
mix and lower land quality can explain some of the observed IR in model 1
and 2.
Model 4 controls for dierences in land quality due to irrigation. Previous
studies have used the proportion of arable land that is irrigated. Here a
dummy variable is used because as much as 93% of the observations have
reported no irrigation, observed as zero, and over 50% of the observations
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have full irrigation so the continuous variable acts almost like a binary vari-
able. As we see in column 4 the coecient in front of the irrigation dummy
is positive and signicant at the 95% level. The land yield elasticity with
respect to operational size increases slightly, which implies in fact that the
proportion of irrigation increases with farm size.
The last model incorporates dummies for organisational forms. The coe-
cients are relative to category 3. None of the coecients for organisational
form are signicant and thus seem not to be a determinant of land yield.
The observed negative coecient for operated area in the previous models is
kept intact implying that the IR is not dependent on organisational form.
7.1 Interpretations of the results
As previously explained a negative relationship between operational size and
land yield implies that labour market imperfections lead small farms to ap-
ply a higher labour/land ratio and thus have the ability of having multiple
cropping ratios and/or use a larger part of the available land. Lack of farm
level data on labour inputs prevents a direct test on the IR between labour
use and farm size. An indirect test for labour market dualism suggested by
Bhalla (1979) is to regress model 3 and 4 only for large farms. If labour mar-
ket imperfections are the reason behind the observed IR we should expect
the relationship between land yield and operational scale to be non-existent
for large farms that are completely dependent on hired labour. The problem
is to know at which operational scale family labour input becomes negligible.
I will use the same approach as (Bhalla, 1979) and regress model 3 and 4 for
farms larger than 12 hectares. Although family labour can still be an im-
portant input for some range of the farms above 12 hectares, we still expect
the IR to become less signicant as farms larger than 12 hectares should to
a higher degree be dependent on hired labour.
As we see in table 3 the relationship between land yield and operated size is
insignicant. Incorporating irrigation we see that we cannot reject that ^1
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Table 3: Regressions results for farms>12 hectares
Variable Model 3 Model 4
lnOP -0.24 -0.5
(-0.87) (-1.77)
lnQ 0.33 0.32
(2.65) (2.61)
DI 2.48
(3.31)
adj:R2 0.061 0.126
t-statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
Constant term included, but not reported
is dierent from zero at the 5% level of signicance condence level, but the
null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% level of signicance. This supports
the hypothesis that small farms experience higher land yield than large-scale
farms because they apply labour more intensively. Another interesting ob-
servation is that irrigation, the prime indicator of intensive land use (Bhalla,
1979), is positively correlated with farm size indicating that the higher land
yield realised on small-scale farms comes primarily from intensive labour use
and extensive land use. This implies that small-scale farms are able to culti-
vate more of the land available than large-scale farms, and that large farms
will be characterised by a higher proportion of idle land. This is supported
by the qualitative data, where substantial parts of the observed large-scale
farms are left idle.
7.2 Robustness and validity of the results
As noted several times the main objection to the analysis presented above is
the assumption of independence of operated area from land quality. If value
of land, used as a proxy for land quality, does not fully reect dierences in
land quality and if larger farms have inferior land quality, the observed IR
is overstated or worse may cause the IR. The only way to be sure that land
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quality is not causing a biased estimate is to include a variable for individual
farm quality (Benjamin, 1995). The consequence of lacking information on
soil fertility and the mentioned problems of using land value as a proxy
for land quality is that we cannot fully exclude land quality as an omitted
variable. Another objection to the relevance of the above analysis is that the
method is only partial in the sense that it only assesses the use of one factor
of production -land- as a measure of eciency. As noted and stressed in Van
Zyl et al. (1995) it is total factor productivity (TFP) that is the relevant
measure of eciency. TFP evaluates the opportunity costs of all inputs used
in production relative to the output produced. The ability to compare TFP
on farms depends on the availability of detailed data on input use for each
farm. The lack of information on input use at the farm level makes this
analysis impossible to conduct. Even with complete information on input
use, TFP is dicult to calculate as a large part of the theory rests on the
assumption of the use of surplus labour, with little or no opportunity cost, on
small farms. There is no comparable wage for surplus labour so the social cost
of its use needs to be imputed. An example is an exercise in (Bhalla, 1979)
where the TFP at one extreme is rst calculated with zero opportunity cost
for surplus labour based on the Lewis assumption for surplus labour. Further
the TFP is calculated with successively increased opportunity cost from 1
2
,3
4
of
the market wage to the other extreme where the opportunity cost is increased
to the full market wage. Under the assumption of zero opportunity cost TFP
uniformly declines with farm size. The intermediate results conrm that
smaller farms have higher TFP. When the surplus labour is evaluated at full
market wage there is only a decline for farms over 15 hectare. These results
are consistent with theory; small farms use cheap labour and little land while
large-scale sector have abundant land and dependent on expensive capital.
Although theory predicts that TFP should be decreasing with farm size, it
should not be taken for granted, with available data a comparison of TFP
across the production scale should have been included. Although a non-
decreasing TFP as farm size increases should not lead to a conclusion that
an IR is non-existent, the above analysis is still meaningful, especially in the
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case of land reform. As pointed out by Berry and Cline (1979) TFP is not
only the relevant measure of eciency. If the goal is to maximize output then
TFP is the relevant eciency criterion, but if some weight is given to income
distribution, poverty alleviation and labour absorption the highest TFP may
not maximize social welfare. These criteria are important goals for the land
reform, and the partial analysis can safely be granted some relevance.
As a control for the above results I have redone the analysis for land reform
projects - farms that have been redistributed through the reform - leaving
out the private farms form the sample. This is just to ensure that the results
are not dependent on the observations from small private family farms and
that the results are directly transferable to redistributed farms. The results
are presented in appendix B, and a part from fewer observations they do not
alter the conclusions.
8 Conclusion and policy recommendations
This paper shows that it would be favourable for the land reform in South
Africa to take a new direction and equalise the land distribution. This con-
clusion is based on the observation that there is a signicant negative re-
lationship between land yield, dened as the value of crop production per
land unit, and both farm size and operated area for beneciary farms. This
indicates that small-scale beneciaries are more productive than large-scale
beneciaries. The results are still signicant after controlling for land quality,
product mix, fallow land and organisational form, underlining the conclusion
that smaller farms are more productive. The analysis exploits the fact that
if the observed IR is a result of labour market imperfections the IR should
become less signicant for large farms. This is because variation in land
yield due to the dierence in family labour input should be less inuential
for large farms that to a higher degree are dependent on hired labour. The
results further show that the inverse relationship is less signicant for larger
farms indicating that the observed inverse relationship is due to labour mar-
43
ket dualism. Irrigation, which is the prime indicator for the possibility of
multiple cropping ratios (intensive land use) during the agricultural season,
is positively correlated with farm size. This indicates that the dierence in
land yield does not come from more irrigation on small farms, but as a re-
sult of more extensive land use on small-farms. The main conclusion drawn
from the analysis is that small-scale land reform projects use more labour per
land unit and thereby have the opportunity to cultivate and harvest a larger
proportion of the available land than large-scale land reform projects. This
indicates that subdividing larger holdings will increase land use, output and
absorption of labour, which are all important factors of the goals of the land
reform. The results provide a strong indication that the subdivision of large
farms is a criterion for success of the land reform. Possible explanations of
the results may be that the factors that can lead to external economies of
scale in agricultural production - skill, access to credit and markets - are to a
certain degree absent for the population the land reform is trying to target.
This makes small - and medium-scale production more successful.
However, the conclusions should be treated with caution. An indirect test
of labour market imperfections is only secondary to direct observations on
input use. A second weakness of the analysis is the use of land price as an
indicator of land quality, especially since the main objection against the IR
hypothesis is that unobserved land quality obscures the observed relationship
between land productivity and farm size. An improvement, and suggestion
for further research, could be an analysis of panel data, controlling for xed
eects, as well as the inclusion of soil fertility data.
Nevertheless the results from the econometric analysis and the qualitative
data support the hypothesis of an inverse farm size - productivity relation-
ship. All of the projects visited had idle land and the majority of the bene-
ciaries reported serious cooperation problems. This gives entitlement to re-
peat the policy recommendations given in Binswanger and Deininger (1993),
a paper written before the land reform program was initiated. It gave a strong
plea for the necessity for land reform in South Africa and outlined a plan for
action where they recommended the following: "By (the beneciary group)
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having the freedom to choose their farms, internal management schemes, and
subdivisions, they can select locations and farming systems most appropri-
ate to the capital and skill endowments of their members" (Binswanger and
Deininger, 1993).
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9 Appendix A
A major problem with the dataset is that a substantial number of obser-
vations had unrealistic high yield values and high land values per operated
area. For instance, 3% of the observations have value of output per hectare
above R10 million, which is approximately equal to 1,21 million US 2008
dollars (Norges Bank, 2009). This may be due to measurement error, data
entry error or inaccurate information from the respondents. Deleting these
extreme values is of course not an optimal solution to the problem, but the
data does not contain sucient information to impute values where the val-
ues recorded are obviously errors. However, the results from the analysis of
the original data set in table 4 show that the data cleaning process does not
signicantly alter the conclusions. This implies that the results are robust to
errors in the data cleaning process.
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Table 4: Regression results for log of land yield for complete cases
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lnFS -0.753
(-21.62)
lnOP -0.685 -0.44 -0.48 -0.567
(-19.61) (-7.65) (-7.90) (-8.78)
lnQ 0.33 0.32 0.30
(5.09) (4.82) (4.55)
DI 1.124 0.688
(2.16) (1.29)
Dpri -0.60
(-0.58)
Dprjpri 0.31
(0.30)
Dcoll 1.53
(1.42)
R2 0.45 0.421 0.4594 0.469 0.49
adj:R2 0.457 0.465 0.485
t-statistics in parentheses.
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
Constant term included, but not reported
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10 Appendix B
Table 5: Regression results for log of land yield for land reform projects
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
lnFS -0.73
(-12.96)
lnOP -0.63 -0.59 -0.62 -0.68
(-11.46) (-8.29) (-8.24) (-8.55)
lnQ 0.063 0.05 0.046
(0.71) (0.64) (0.55)
DI 0.51 0.15
(1.05) (0.55)
Dpri
Dprjpri -1.06
(-2.19)
Dcoll -0.713
(-0.81)
R2 0.389 0.335 0.336 0.339 0.35
adj:R2 0.331 0.332 0.34
t-statistics in parentheses
p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01
Constant term included, but not reported
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